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This paper considers the problem of optimal unemployment insurance in a moral
hazard framework. Unlike existing literature, unemployed workers can secretly par-
ticipate in a hidden labor market ; as a consequence, an endogenous lower bound for
promised utility preventing “immiserization” arises. Moreover, the presence of a hidden
labor market makes possible an extra deviation and therefore hardens the provision of
incentives. Under linear cost of effort, we show that the optimal contract prescribes
no participation in the hidden labor market and a decreasing sequence of unemploy-
ment payments until the lower bound for promised utility is reached. At that moment,
participation jumps and unemployment payments drop down to zero. For the case of
non-linear effort cost we calibrate the model to Spain. As in the linear cost of effort, this
exercise reproduces no participation and decreasing payments during the initial phase
of unemployment. After around three years of unemployment, the contract prescribes
a jump in participation and an abrupt decline in unemployment payments. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper justifying an abrupt drop in unemployment
payments. In addition, the quantitative analysis suggests that in an environment in
which agents differ in separation rate, the hidden labor market reinforces the benefits
from a type-dependent unemployment system.
JEL Classification: D63, D74, D82, D83, H55, I38, J65.
Keywords: Unemployment Insurance, Hidden Labor Markets, Moral Hazard, Recursive
Contracts.
∗We gratefully acknowledge A´rpa´d A´braha´m for constant encouragement and valuable advice. We are also
grateful with Mark Aguiar for enhancing the quality of the paper with detailed comments. We also thank
Fernando Alvarez, Rachana Bhatt, William Hawkins, Cagatay Kayi, Luis Marques, Juan Pablo Nicolini,
Jesu´s Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Gianluca Violante and other seminar participants for useful conversations. All
remaining errors are our own.
†University of Rochester and Central Bank of Venezuela. Email: falvarez@troi.cc.rochester.edu.
‡University of Rochester. Email: sncz@troi.cc.rochester.edu.
1
1 Introduction
Unemployed workers face a trade-off between search effort and leisure. Since effort is unob-
servable, the design of unemployment insurance systems balances insurance and incentives.
This moral hazard problem has been the object of study since the pioneering work of Shavell
and Weiss (1979). In this literature it is assumed that employment status is observable and
hence individuals cannot cheat by working and asking for unemployment payments. But
what if there is a shadow economy that allows unemployed individuals to secretly work and,
simultaneously, ask for unemployment payments? This paper explores the implications of
a hidden labor market in the design of optimal unemployment insurance. Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (2001) stress the importance of this contribution:
Our focus in discussing optimal unemployment insurance has been the group of workers whose
unemployment risk is higher, namely, the less educated and less experienced workers. Often,
the members of this group find job opportunities mostly in the informal sector of the economy.
Therefore, it may be very hard to monitor the employment status of the worker. Our inves-
tigation assumed that while search effort is not observable, employment status is. A strong
incentive problem arises when the latter does not hold, since an unemployed worker receiving
benefits would not have incentives to disclose having found a job.
Table 1 reports three facts suggesting that incorporating a hidden labor market in the
study of optimal unemployment insurance might be crucial1:
• The hidden labor market or the shadow economy is important in many countries,
ranging from 13-30 percent of GDP in industrialized economies to 39-76 for African
countries.
• In economies with a sizeable shadow economy, unemployment is a likely event. On
average, unemployment rates range from 6.8 in industrialized economies to 11.6 for
African countries.
1We interpret the informal sector as a hidden labor market in which the worker can always find a job but
his productivity is lower than in the formal sector.
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• With different coverage, replacement rate, and benefits duration, most of the countries
protect the workers against unemployment risk.2 Replacement rates are around 45-75
percent during 1-2 years.
In light of these facts, it is reasonable to think about economies where the hidden labor
market is important, workers face high unemployment risk, and the government provides
unemployment insurance. In the current paper we study the optimal unemployment insur-
ance in economies with these features.
Incorporating a hidden labor market modifies the standard unemployment insurance
problem. Methodologically, the presence of a hidden labor market imposes an endogenous
lower bound for promised utilities that has to be incorporated as an explicit restriction in
the planner’s problem. In addition, participation in the hidden labor market hardens the
encouragement of job search effort. In fact, unless the cost of effort is linear, an extra
incentive compatibility constraint must be added to keep participation at the desired level.
Important insights can be obtained in the case of linear cost of effort, when the un-
employment insurance system can be characterized analytically. Initially, consumption is
strictly decreasing during unemployment and workers do not participate in the hidden labor
market. For sufficiently large unemployment spells, the lower bound for promised utilities is
eventually reached. Only at that moment, the optimal contract prescribes positive participa-
tion in the hidden labor market together with zero unemployment payments. Also, once the
lower bound for promised utilities binds, planner’s instruments—taxes and benefits—and
prescriptions—search effort and hidden labor market participation—remain constant over
time.
2Also, the number of countries providing unemployment insurance programs increased from 21 in 1940
to 68 in 1997. Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1997 (Social Security Administration, US).
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Table 1: Shadow economy size, unemployment rate, and unemployment insurance
Shadow Unem- Unemployment insurance
economy ployment Replacement
% GDP rate % Coverage rates % Benefit duration
Industria- Vary 6.8 Most of the countries Vary between Most of the
lized eco- between provide and cover all 40 and 75. countries limit
nomies 13 and 30. the employed. Higher in Sweden the length between
and Denmark. 8 and 36 weeks.
Transition Vary 9.2 Most of the countries Vary between Most of the
economies between provide and cover all 50 and 75. countries limit is
9 and 43. the employed. Some countries 26 weeks. Exception
flat benefits. Hungary, 2 years.
Latin Vary 8.0 Most of the countries Vary between Maximum
America between provide and cover all 50 and 60. entitlement
and the 25 and 60. the employed. Some countries 1 year.
Caribbean flat benefits.
Asia Vary 4.8 Differs significantly. Vary between Bangladesh 30-120
between Bangladesh only 50 and 55. days. China 1-2
13 and 70. commerce and industry. years. South Korea
South Korea: all firms. 90-240 days.
Africa Vary 11.6 Egypt excludes Vary between Vary between
between public sector workers. 45 and 75. 26 weeks and
39 and 76. South Africa excludes 3 years.
highly paid workers.
Sources: Schneider and Enste (2000), ILO (2004) and Vodopivec and Raju (2002).
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For the case of non-linear effort cost, we calibrate the model to Spain. The quantitative
results resemble those obtained in the linear case. For the benchmark calibration, partici-
pation is zero during the first three years and unemployment payments decrease gradually.
Just after that moment, participation in the hidden labor market jumps to a fairly constant
level, and unemployment payments drop down to zero.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper justifying an abrupt decline in
unemployment payments. The intuition goes as follow. Initially, participation remains at
zero to facilitate the encouragement of search effort. More specifically, zero participation
helps to encourage search effort because: (i) the marginal cost of search effort remains low,
and (ii) decreasing payments translates to decreasing consumption. Eventually, when the
consumption delivered by payments is too low, zero participation is not longer incentive
compatible. At that moment, unemployment payments decrease abruptly. This variation
in payments does not imply such variation of consumption because workers participate in
hidden labor market to smooth consumption. Nevertheless, this drop provides dynamic
incentives guaranteeing that long run unemployment remains a serious threat.
In addition, the results indicate that a hidden labor market reinforces the importance of a
type-dependent unemployment insurance system for economies in which labor mobility differs
among workers. In particular, payments duration should be shorter for workers with higher
separation rates. The intuition behind this result goes as follow. When separation rates are
lower, jobs are more “valuable” and therefore the planner is willing to delay participation in
the hidden labor market. Naturally, this requires more unemployment payments to workers
with lower separation rates.
Unemployment insurance systems have been studied from two different perspectives. One
approach uses quantitative general equilibrium models to study the influence of unemploy-
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ment insurance systems on macroeconomics variable and welfare—see for example Hansen
and Imrohoroglu (1992) and Wang and Williamson (1996). The other approach, followed by
this paper, uses contract theory in a partial equilibrium environment to study the optimal
design of unemployment insurance. In a moral hazard framework in which the planner can
only choose unemployment payments, early contributions find that payments must decrease
over time in order to encourage search effort—Shavell and Weiss (1979). A subsequent work
allows the planner to choose, together with unemployment payments, an after re-employment
tax, and numerically solves for the optimal contract using a recursive representation of the
problem. The paper finds that extending the planner’s sets of instruments does not mod-
ify the previous result of a decreasing path for unemployment payments—Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997).
A controversial result from this early literature is that the optimal contract leads unem-
ployed workers toward “immiserization”. More precisely, “if the workers utility function is
unbounded below then efficiency requires that workers expected discounted utility falls, with
positive probability, below any arbitrary negative level”—Pavoni (2003). To prevent this re-
sult, Pavoni (2003) imposes an arbitrary lower bound for promised utility and characterizes
the resulting optimal unemployment insurance.3 Our work is related to this idea because it
justifies the existence of a lower bound in life-time utility and connects it with the structure
of the economy through the presence of a hidden labor market. However, our problem goes
beyond a justification for the lower bound for promised utility imposed in Pavoni (2003);
in particular, the presence of a hidden labor market makes possible an extra deviation and
therefore hardens the provision of incentives.
3There are several related environments where “immiserization” does not hold. For instance, see Wang
(1995) and Phelan (1995).
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The policy implications of a hidden labor market are studied in different environments
and with different goals. Among others, labor regulations, wage controls, migration policies,
and taxation are analyzed in frameworks with hidden labor markets by Banerjee (1983),
Fortin, Marceau, and Savard (1997), and Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998).
Surprisingly, there is not paper in this strand of literature considering the optimal design
of unemployment insurance. Our work fills this gap studying the implications of a hidden
labor market for the optimal unemployment insurance.
Two recent papers are related to our work because of their interest in the informal
sector or bad jobs and unemployment insurance. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2001) study the
effects of heterogeneity on the design of optimal unemployment insurance. Importantly,
they comment that one way to cope the incentive problem generated by an informal sector
is to design programs that require those receiving benefits to appear at the insurance office.
As they mention, this monitoring schemes may come at a significant cost. We designed
an incentive compatible contract that requires no monitoring. Likewise, Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (2005) focus on workers’ incentives to accept bad jobs when layoffs and quits are
undistinguishable. In particular, their interest is about workers accepting and then quitting
those jobs just to upgrade their unemployment insurance benefits. Instead, we study the
possibility that those jobs are non-observable, what implies that workers could accept them
and ask for unemployment payments.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived risk averse workers. At each
period, a worker’s labor status is denoted by mt. The variable mt ∈ {u, e}, where u stands
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for unemployment and e for employment. The employment history of a worker up to time t
is represented by ht = (m0, ...,mt).
In contrast to previous studies, this environment includes a secondary labor market in
which workers obtain a wage, $, for unit of participation, s. Henceforth, we refer to this
market as the hidden labor market.
Workers employed in the formal sector—employed workers—exert a constant work effort
a¯, have productivity of ω, and receive wages w. Employment relationships exogenously end
with probability δ. By assumption, we rule out participation in the hidden labor market
while employed as well as on-the-job search. Productivity in the hidden labor market is
lower than in the formal sector, $ < ω.
Unemployed workers search for a job and can, simultaneously, participate in the hidden
labor market. When exerting search effort a, they find a job next period with probability
p(a). The total effort while unemployed, x, is restricted to lie in the compact set [0, ϑ]. The
function p is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice differentiable and satisfies standard
Inada conditions.
The instantaneous felicity function is separable in consumption and total effort
u(c)− v(x). (1)
The function u reflects the utility from consumption. It is strictly increasing and bounded
above by u. It is also strictly concave, twice differentiable, and satisfies Inada conditions.
Similarly, the function v measures the cost of effort exerted either when searching for a job,
when participating in the hidden labor market or when employed. We assume this function
is convex, strictly increasing and twice differentiable. Notice that total effort, x, equals a¯ if
the worker is employed and s + a otherwise. Finally, workers can neither save nor borrow
and they discount future with the factor β ∈ (0, 1).
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We suppose there is a risk neutral planner who provides unemployment insurance and
affects workers’ earnings by levying a history dependent after-reemployment tax. The plan-
ner cannot observe either hidden labor market participation, s, or job search effort, a. He
can borrow and save at a constant interest rate r = 1/β − 1.
2.2 Optimal Contract Problem
The planner has to decide unemployment payments, after reemployment wages, search effort,
and hidden labor market participation. A contract, precisely described in the next definition,
collects those decision for each possible history node.
Definition 1 A contract or unemployment insurance system, W, is a collection of
functions specifying unemployment payments, b, wages after reemployment, w, search effort,
a, and hidden labor market participation, s, for each possible history, ht, at each period; i.e.,
W = {bt(ht), wt(ht), at(ht), st(ht)}.
Notice that a contract can be divided into two components: those representing planner’s
direct instruments, I = {bt(ht), wt(ht)}, and those representing planner’s prescriptions for
non-observable workers’ actions, P = {at(ht), st(ht)}.
Feasibility imposes some restrictions on the set of contracts. In particular, planner’s
prescriptions, P , and instruments, I, are required to belong to the following sets:
A = {P : for each ht and each t, (at(ht), st(ht)) ∈ [0, ϑ]2, at(ht) + st(ht) ≤ ϑ
if mt = u, and at(h
t) = st(h
t) = 0 if mt = e},
T = {I : bt(ht) ≥ 0 for each ht, with equality if mt = e, and wt(ht) > 0 }.
Thus, a contract W = (P , I) is said to be a feasible contract if (P , I) ∈ A × T. Notice
that each contract prescribes sequences for consumption, c, total effort, x, and one period
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planner’s payoffs, y, as follows:
ct(h
t) =
{
bt(h
t) + st(h
t)$ if mt = u
wt(h
t) if mt = e
xt(h
t) =
{
at(h
t) + st(h
t) if mt = u
a¯ if mt = e
yt(h
t) =
{
−bt(ht) if mt = u
ω − wt(ht) if mt = e.
(2)
Define Ut(W ;ht) as the workers’ promised utility associated with the contract W , from
a particular history ht. Likewise, define Vt(W ;ht) as the planner’s continuation value. That
is,
Ut(W ;ht) ≡ Et
[ ∞∑
n=t
βn−t(u(cn(hn))− v(xn(hn)))|W , ht
]
, (3)
Vt(W ;ht) ≡ Et
[ ∞∑
n=t
βn−tyn(hn)|W , ht
]
. (4)
In (3)-(4) expectations are taken conditional on the contract W and on the initial node
ht. This is because the actions prescribed by the contract affect the probability measure on
histories.
Since search effort and hidden labor market participation are not observable, the un-
employment insurance scheme has to be incentive compatible. That is, the levels of search
effort and hidden labor market participation prescribed by the optimal contract have to be
consistent with workers’ best responses.
Definition 2 A contract W = (P , I) is incentive compatible if for each history and each
period, there is not an alternative feasible action P˜ providing a higher lifetime utility for the
worker than the one induced by the contract; i.e., for each ht and t,
Ut((P , I);ht) ≥ Ut((P˜ , I);ht) for each P˜ ∈ A. (5)
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In the standard dynamic moral hazard model—without hidden labor markets, Pavoni
(2003) shows that the constrained efficient contract “implies a weaker form of what is known
as the immiserization result: if the workers utility function is unbounded below then efficiency
requires that workers expected discounted utility falls, with positive probability, below any
arbitrary negative level”.4 In the environment presented in this paper, we show that the
contract cannot punish the worker with a promised utility below the critical value U , where
U ≡ u(s
∗$)− v(s∗)
1− β , (6)
and s∗ solves
u′(s∗$)$ = v′(s∗). (7)
We call U the lower bound for promised utilities. Notice it is the life-time utility the worker
attains when she does not search for a job at any period, receives no unemployment payments,
and chooses participation in the hidden labor market optimally. The proposition 1 formally
states this result. Before presenting the formal proof, we remark that optimality requires
mt+1 = mt = e⇒ Ut(W ;ht) = Ut+1(W ;ht+1). (8)
As we argue next, this is because the cheapest way to provide certain life-time utility in
absence of incentive friction is to guarantee the worker a constant stream of consumption.
Proposition 1 (No “immiserization”) In the optimal contract there is not “immiseriza-
tion”; i.e., the promised utilities provided by the constrained efficient contractW∗ are bounded
below by U.
Proof: See Appendix.
4See proposition 3 in Pavoni (2003). Green (1987) and Thomas and Worral (1990) in repeated unobserv-
able endowments economies, prove a similar but stronger result.
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The intuition for this result is transparent: the hidden labor market provides a protection
for the workers that prevents “immiserization”. Whenever the planner pretends to deliver a
promised utility below U , the worker deviates to guarantee herself at least U .
A direct implication of the last result is that problem (11)-(13) is not well defined when-
ever U < U because the set of incentive compatible contracts is empty. In contrast, we prove
that for each U ≥ U there is always an incentive compatible contract providing U to the
workers. This result is formalized in lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Define C(U ;h0) as the set of incentive compatible contracts providing promised
utility greater or equal than U given initial state h0; i.e.,
C(U ;h0) ≡ {W ∈ C : U0((P , I);h0) ≥ U}. (9)
Then, for any U ≥ U , the set C(U) is not empty.
Proof: See Appendix.
Recall that u is bounded above u. As a consequence, the lifetime utilities the contract
can deliver is bounded above by U ≡ u
1−β . Define Pm as the set of promised utilities lower
than U such that C(U ;h0) 6= ∅ when h0 = m. From proposition 1 and lemma 1 it transpires
Pu = Pe = P ≡ {U ∈ R : U ≥ U ≥ U}. (10)
The set P is the set of promised utility the contract can deliver. In order to define the
contractual problem, let F be the set of all feasible contracts and U be the utility the contract
has to deliver to the worker. When the planner offers a contract to a worker whose initial
labor status equals m0, it solves
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V m0(U) = max
W∈F
V0(W ;h0) (11)
s.t
W ∈ C(U,m0), (12)
U0(W ;h0) ≥ U. (13)
Ut(W ;ht) ∈ P∀ht, t (14)
Equations (12) and (13) are, respectively, the incentive compatibility and the promise keeping
constraints. The contract solving problem (11)-(13) is called the constrained efficient contract
and is denoted by W∗.
2.3 Recursive Representation
Due to its history dependence, the problem (11)-(13) is not tractable for quantitative pur-
poses. Fortunately, following the lines of Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Abreu, Pearce,
and Stacchetti (1990) the problem has a recursive representation in which the history is com-
pletely encoded in two single variables, namely, promised utility and labor status. As implied
by proposition 1 and lemma 1, the planner’s problem is well defined if and only if promised
utility is not smaller than U . Therefore, the recursive representation must explicitly impose
that promised utilities belong to P.
Before presenting the recursive planner’s problem we introduce the definition of a recur-
sive contract.
Definition 3 A recursive contract or unemployment insurance system, WR, is a
collection of functions specifying unemployment payments, b, wages after reemployment, w,
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search effort, a, hidden labor market participation, s, and promised utilities in any state m,
Um, for each U in P; i.e., WR = {b(U), w(U), a(U), s(U), Uu(U), U e(U)}.
A recursive contract can be divided into two components: those representing planner’s
direct instruments, IR = {b(U), w(U), Uu(U), U e(U)}, and those representing planner’s pre-
scriptions for workers’ actions, PR = {a(U), s(U)}.
In order to define the planner’s problem recursively, let E be the set of one-period feasible
actions andM the set of one-period best response of workers, taking as given unemployment
payments and promised utilities. That is,
E ≡ {(a, s) : a ≥ 0, s ≥ 0 and s+ a ≤ ϑ},
M ≡ {argmax(a,s)∈E u(b+ s$)− v(a+ s) + β[p(a)U e + (1− p(a))Uu]}.
Then, the planner’s problem is represented by the following functional equations system:
V u(U) = max
b,a,s,Uu,Ue
−b+ β[p(a)V e(U e) + (1− p(a))V u(Uu)], (15)
s.t.
u(b+ s$)− v(s+ a) + β[p(a)U e + (1− p(a))Uu]− U = 0, (16)
(a, s) ∈M, (17)
(Uu, U e) ∈ P2, (18)
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With
V e(U) = max
U˜u,U˜e,w
ω − w + β[δV u(U˜u) + (1− δ)V e(U˜ e)]
s.t.
u(w)− v(a) + β[(1− δ)U˜ e + δU˜u]− U = 0,
(U˜u, U˜ e) ∈ P2,
Equation (16) is the promise keeping constraint in recursive form, while equation (17) is
the incentive compatibility constraint. Finally, (18) restricts the value of promised utilities
to the set P. We call this constraint the feasibility of promised utilities constraint (FPUC).
Pavoni (2003) also introduces a lower bound for promised utility in his recursive rep-
resentation of the optimal unemployment insurance problem. However, the framework we
propose here differs from that studied by Pavoni (2003) in some crucial aspects. First, our
lower bound is explicitly connected with the structure of the economy and it is not arbitrar-
ily imposed but arises due to incentive compatibility. More importantly, the participation
in the hidden labor market affects the incentives provision due to its effect on the marginal
cost of effort and the marginal utility of consumption. In other words, the presence of a
hidden labor market involves not only a lower bound for promised utilities, but also an extra
constraint when providing incentives.
The inconvenience with the previous representation is that constraint (17) is a compli-
cated object which makes the problem non-tractable. A common strategy is the so called
first order condition approach. To describe this strategy, consider an unemployed worker who
takes as given (b, Uu, U e) and chooses (a, s) ∈ E to maximize utility.5 For such a problem
5Under the assumption that p satisfies Inada conditions and provided that in equilibrium Ue > Uu, we
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the first order condition are:
βp′(a)[U e − Uu]− v′(s+ a) = 0, (ICC1)
−u′(b+ s$)$ + v′(s+ a) ≥ 0. (ICC2)
Now define Mfoc as the set of all (a, s) ∈ E such that equations (ICC1)-(ICC2) are
satisfied. The first order condition approach basically replaces constraint (17) in the recursive
problem (15)-(18) by the condition that (a, s) ∈Mfoc.
Since M ⊆ Mfoc, the solution to the problem using the first order condition approach
may differ from the solution to the original problem. A recent example is provided in
Kocherlakota (2004). In our environment, given (b, Uu, U e), the worker’s problem is convex.
This implies that the first order conditions are both necessary and sufficient and hence, the
first order approach is valid.6
Using the first order condition approach, the recursive planner’s problem is
V u(U) = max
b,a,s,Uu,Ue
−b+ β[p(a)V e(U e) + (1− p(a))V u(Uu)], (PP)
s.t.
u(b+ s$)− v(s+ a) + β[p(a)U e + (1− p(a))Uu]− U = 0, (PKC)
βp′(a)[U e − Uu]− v′(s+ a) = 0, (ICC1)
− u′(b+ s$)$ + v′(s+ a) ≥ 0, (ICC2)
(U e, Uu) ∈ P2, (FPUC)
s ≥ 0,
can guarantee that the non-negativity constraint for a is never binding. Likewise, we can always set ϑ big
enough to avoid a+ s = ϑ. Hence, we only focus on non-negativity constraint for participation in the hidden
labor market.
6First notice that E is a convex set. Second, the function f , defined as f(a, s) = u(b + s$) − v(a) +
β(p(a)Ue + (1− p(a))Uu), is a strictly concave function provided that Ue ≥ Uu.
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With
V e(U) = max
U˜u,U˜e,w
ω − w + β[δV u(U˜u) + (1− δ)V e(U˜ e)]
s.t.
u(w)− v(a) + β[(1− δ)U˜ e + δU˜u]− U = 0,
(U˜u, U˜ e) ∈ P2,
Henceforth, we refer to the previous problem as (PP). We use this problem to analytically
characterize the first best contract—the optimal contract without information frictions—and
the constrained efficient contract with linear cost of effort. We also use it to numerically
characterize the constrained efficient contract with non-linear cost of effort. 7
2.4 First best contract
As a benchmark, we characterize the optimal contract when search effort and participation
in the hidden labor market are both observable. The problem is the same as in (PP) but
now there is no need to introduce constraints (ICC1), (ICC2), and (FPUC).
Let λ be the multiplier associated with constraint (PKC). Then the first order conditions
7As commented before, since there is not moral hazard during employment, optimality requires that
promised utility during employment remains constant; that is U˜e = U . To see this, notice that the first
order condition with respect to U˜e together with envelope condition yield
V ′e(U˜e) = V ′e(U),
which implies U˜e = U provided concavity of V e. The functions V u, V e turn out to be strictly concave in all
the numerical experiments we performed.
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satisfied by first best contract are
(s :) − u′(b+ s$)$ + v′(s+ a) ≥ 0, (19)
(b :)
1
u′(c)
= λ, (20)
(Uu :) λ+ V
′u(Uu) = 0, (21)
(U e :) λ+ V
′e(U e) = 0, (22)
(a :) βp′(a)[V e(U e)− V u(Uu)] = λ[v′(a+ s)− βp′(a)(U e − Uu)]. (23)
Envelope condition implies
V
′u(U) = −λ =⇒ V ′u(Uu) = −λ′ . (24)
Combining (20),(21) and (24),
1
u′(c)
− 1
u′(c′)
= 0 =⇒ c = c′ . (25)
That is, the first best allocation implies a constant stream of consumption during unemploy-
ment.8
Notice that under hidden effort, the first best allocation is not incentive compatible
when planner values employment state and unemployment state differently. This is clear
since (23) is inconsistent with (ICC1). However, if the planner has control over search effort,
observability regarding participation in the hidden labor market becomes immaterial. This
property is formally stated in lemma 2.
Lemma 2 If search effort is observable, the first best allocation is achievable even if the
planner cannot observe participation in the hidden labor market.
8Using a similar argument, it can be shown that there is also constant consumption across labor status.
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Proof: See Appendix.
The reason for the last result is that once search effort is guaranteed at the social optimum
level, planner and worker’s positions regarding the optimal level of participation in the hidden
labor market are aligned. However, it does not imply we can discard (ICC2) when solving the
problem with asymmetric information. When search effort is not observable, the cost and the
benefit of an additional unit of participation in the hidden labor market are valued differently
by the planner and by the worker. In particular, the planner internalizes the marginal effect
of a unit of hidden labor market participation in the cost of providing incentives to make
compatible the desired search effort. In contrast, with linear cost of effort, there is no
marginal change in the cost of effort and hence this situation does not arise. This result is
presented in lemma (3).
Lemma 3 If v is linear, we can solve the problem (PP) without considering (ICC2).
Proof: See Appendix.
2.5 Constrained efficient contract
Now we turn to the case in which the planner does not observe either search effort or hidden
labor market participation. As mentioned, we characterize this contract through the problem
labeled as (PP).
Let µ1 be the multiplier associated with (ICC1), µ2 the multiplier associated with (ICC2)
and φ the one associated with non-negativity constraint for s. As before, let λ be the
multiplier associated with (PKC). Finally, let ξu and ξe be the multipliers associated with
constraints (FPUC) for Uu and U e, respectively.
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The first order conditions for the planner’s problem are
(s :) λ[u′(b+ s$)$ − v′(s+ a)]− µ1v′′(s+ a) = (26)
µ2[u
′′(b+ s$)$2 − v′′(s+ a)] + φ,
(b :) λ =
1
u′(c)
+ µ2
u′′(c)$
u′(c)
=
1
u′(c)
− µ2ρa(c)$, (27)
(Uu :) λ+ V
′u(Uu) +
ξu
β(1− p(a)) = µ1
p′(a)
1− p(a) , (28)
(U e :) λ+ V
′e(U e) +
ξe
βp(a)
= −µ1p
′(a)
p(a)
, (29)
(a :) p′(a)[V e(U e)− V u(Uu)]+
µ1[βp
′′(a)(U e − Uu)− v′′(s+ a)] + µ2v′′(s+ a) = 0, (30)
where ρa represents the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. These conditions together
with complementary slackness and the corresponding constraints completely characterize
the contract solving (PP).
Using envelope condition and equations (27)-(28) we can get the expression that governs
the profile of consumption during unemployment spell,
1
u′(c)
− 1
u′(c′)
+$[µ′2ρa(c
′)− µ2ρa(c)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
%
+
ξu
β(1− p(a)) = µ1
p′(a)
1− p(a) . (31)
There, we can see that the presence of a hidden labor market affects the profile of con-
sumption during unemployment through three ways: (1) a direct effect represented by the
term % which does not show up in the standard case, (2) an indirect effect through the term
µ1 and, (3) other direct effect through the term ξ
u.9
In order to provide a further characterization of the problem, we must either add as-
sumptions about functional forms, or rely on numerical solution. In the remaining of the
9Notice that the term % in (31) is a function of the absolute coefficient of risk aversion. A similar result
is found in an environment with moral hazard and hidden savings. See Abraham and Pavoni (2005).
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paper we develop both strategies.
3 Qualitative analysis
In this section the cost of effort is defined by
v(x) = αx. (32)
With this additional assumption, we can provide a detailed characterization of the con-
strained efficient contract.10
When the cost of effort is defined as in (32), the dynamic of consumption is characterized
by a decreasing path, until a period when it becomes flat. This result is formalized through
a set of lemmas. The first of them shows that consumption is strictly decreasing while the
promised utility is above its lower bound U .
Lemma 4 When the constraint for promised utility if unemployed (FPUC) does not bind—
i.e., Uu > U—the consumption path during unemployment is strictly decreasing.
Proof: First observe that µ2 = 0.
11 To see this, notice that if s = 0, constraint (ICC2) does
not bind and, by complementary slackness, µ2 = 0. On the other hand, if s > 0, equation
(26) implies µ2u
′′(b+ s$)$ = 0 and then µ2 = 0. Now, manipulating first order conditions,
and letting ξu = 0, we find
1
u′(ct)
− 1
u′(ct+1)
= µ1
p′(a)
1− p(a) > 0. (33)
10Some results also hold under a more general specification of v. Consider v(a, s) = g(a) + q(s) with
g′(a) > 0 and q′(s) > 0. Then, the sequence of consumption during unemployed is still decreasing and
bounded below. Likewise, the lower bound for promised utility is eventually reached. Moreover, when
lower bound for promised utility is reached, the contracts prescribes zero payments and the lower bound
for consumption. However, now it is not the case that participation in the hidden labor market occurs only
when the lower bound for promised utility is reached.
11This is consistent with lemma 3 which indicates that with linear cost of effort incentive compatibility
constraint (ICC2) is not needed to formulate the constrained planner’s problem.
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Finally, by strict concavity of u we have ct > ct+1.
Due to the presence of a hidden labor market, the consumption path is bounded below.
This result is formally established in the next lemma.
Lemma 5 The sequence of consumption during unemployment is bounded below by
c ≡ u′−1(α/$).
This consumption level is achieved whenever unemployed workers participate in the hidden
labor market.
Proof: The lower bound may be violated only if b < c. In that case, s = 0 is not incentive
compatible. Since participation in the hidden labor market must be optimal from the agent’s
point of view, it will solve u′(b + s$)$ = α. This implies that whenever the unemployed
worker participates in the hidden labor market, c = b+ s$ = c.
The following lemma deals with the question of whether the lower bound for utility U is
eventually reached for a worker with a sufficiently large unemployment spell.
Lemma 6 For sufficiently large unemployment spell, the lower bound for utility is reached;
i.e., there exist a period t∗ such Uut∗ = U .
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that constraint (FPUC) never binds. Then, we can write
the problem (PP) without it. Moreover, by corollary (1), st = 0 for each t. As a conse-
quence, the problem (PP) collapses into the problem studied by Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997) with no hidden labor market participation and no relevant bound for promised utili-
ties. As known, in this environment ct = bt decreases toward “immiserization”. This implies
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that lower bound for consumption is eventually violated, which contradicts lemma 5.
The next lemma shows that once the lower bound for utility is reached, promised utility
if unemployed remains constant at its minimum level.
Lemma 7 If V u is concave, the lower bound for utility is a fixed point of the function Uu;
i.e., Uu(U) = U .
Proof: Let U = U , using first order condition with respect to Uu and envelope condition
we get
V
′u(Uu)− V ′u(U) = µ1 p
′(a)
(1− p(a)) −
ξu
β(1− p(a)) .
Clearly Uu < U is not possible because it violates (FPUC). Suppose then that Uu > U .
This implies (FPUC) does not bind and hence ξu = 0. However if ξu = 0, the concavity of
V u implies Uu ≤ U , which contradicts our assumption that Uu > U . Therefore, it must be
that Uu = U
Putting these results together we can affirm that initially consumption decreases over the
unemployment spell until the time when the lower bound for utility is reached. From that
period on, consumption remains constant. Denote the level at which consumption stabilizes
by c. We show in the next lemma that consumption stabilizes at its lower bound.
Lemma 8 If V u is concave, at the promised utility’s lower bound, the optimal contract
prescribes the consumption’s lower bound; i.e., c(U) ≡ c = c.
Proof: By lemmas 6 and 7, there exist a t∗ such that Uut = U and ct = c for each t > t
∗.
By lemma 5, c ≥ c which rules out c < c. We prove c > c is not a solution. Suppose by
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contradiction that c > c. Since u′(c)$ < α, at this point s = 0. Let a be the search effort
prescribed in the optimal contract. We can write
u(c)− v(a) + β[p(a)U e + (1− p(a))U ] ≥
u(c) + βU > u(c)− v(s∗) + βU ≡ U.
The first inequality arises form the fact that incentive compatibility requires that the utility
delivered by the contract is not lower than the one associated with any feasible deviation,
in particular with s = a = 0. The second strict inequality arises form our assumption that
c > c and from the fact that v and u are strictly increasing. However, this implies that in
the contract the planner is delivering a lifetime utility strictly higher than the one promised,
which is not optimal. Hence c = c.
Corollary 1 When lower bound for promised utility is not binding, hidden labor market
participation is zero.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that at certain period st 6= 0 but lower bound for promised
utility has not been reached. By lemma (5), ct = c, but since U
u > U , by lemma 4,
ct+1 < ct = c which is a contradiction.
Previous corollary highlights a key property of the optimal contract in the case of linear
cost of effort, namely: the planner initially does not encourage participation in the hidden
labor market. The explanation for this somehow unexpected results is that, once the planner
induces participation, it completely looses ability to punish the worker through reduction in
consumption. Moreover, any further reduction in unemployment payments motivates more
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participation in the hidden labor market and hence, increases the marginal cost of effort,
which make harder to encourage search effort. As we will see in the numerical exercise, this
property is still present, to some extent, in the case of nonlinear cost of effort .
With a hidden labor market consumption does not necessarily equal unemployment pay-
ments. Hence, the characterization of consumption is not enough to identify the optimal
path for unemployment payments. Therefore, we characterize unemployment payments un-
der linear cost of effort. The main result is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If V u is concave, bt+1 < bt If constraint (FPUC) does not binds. If constraint
(FPUC) binds, bt = 0. In other words, unemployment insurance payments decrease until the
lower bound for promised utility is reached. After that moment they become zero.
Proof: When the lower bound for U does not bind, consumption is strictly decreasing
and above c. Since in this phase st = 0, b = c and therefore, unemployment payments also
decrease. When U = U and b is constant at b because Uu(U) = U . Suppose, by contradiction,
b > 0. By incentive compatibility the contract must deliver an utility consistent with worker’s
best response, that is worker’s utility is
U˜ ≡ max
a,s
u(b+$s)− v(a+ s) + β[p(a)U e + (1− p(a))U ].
Moreover, this utility must be as good as any deviation, in particular one in which search
intensity is set to zero and s is set optimally. That is
U˜ ≥ max
s
u(b+$s)− v(s) + βU ≡ Uˆ .
Since u is strictly increasing,
Uˆ > max
s
u($s)− v(s) + βU ≡ U.
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This implies that there exist a feasible reduction in b which increase planner profit. Therefore
b > 0 is not optimum.
Corollary 2 When lower bound for promised utility is binding, hidden labor market partic-
ipation equals s∗ > 0.
Proof: The proof is trivial. When U = U , b=0. Then, by incentive compatibility for s,
s = s∗.
In summary, there a two different phases during unemployment. During the first phase,
payments (consumption) decrease smoothly without reaction of hidden labor market par-
ticipation. It is because the payments are relatively high and hence the marginal cost of
participation is higher than its marginal benefit. However, as payments decline, the marginal
benefit of participation increases, and participation is eventually optimal. At that point the
second phase of unemployment starts. In this phase, with positive participation, linearity
and incentive compatibility uniquely determined the consumption level (c). At that level
of consumption, the promised utility can be satisfied with zero payments (any positive pay-
ments deliver a higher life-time utility). Thus, during this phase, zero payments become
optimal.
A feature of the optimal unemployment insurance is certain lack of smoothness. In
particular, at a certain period, payments drop to zero and hidden labor market participation
jumps away from zero. This lack of smoothness should be striking just if it is reflected
on consumption. This is not the case here since in this phase participation compensates
payments drops, and consumption is perfectly smooth.
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4 Quantitative analysis
In this section we carry out a quantitative analysis for the case of non-linear cost of effort.
First, we present the calibration strategy. Then, we describe the dynamics of unemployment
benefits, job search effort and informal sector participation under the optimal contract.
Finally, we derive welfare implications associated with the implementation of the optimal
contract. The algorithm is presented in the appendix.
4.1 Calibration
Functional forms are standard. Preferences over consumption goods are described by a
constant relative risk aversion function with parameter σ, while the cost of effort function is
v(a) = aγ/γ. Finally, the job finding probability is p(a) = 1− exp(−ρa).
A key preliminary question regarding the calibration is, Which economy should be consid-
ered as benchmark for our calibration? Quantitative research usually uses the U.S. economy.
However, our environment naturally applies to developing countries, where unemployment
rate and informal sector participation are high. Working with developing countries involves
certain problems. First, it is hard to find reliable data for the informal sector. More impor-
tantly, there is not accurate information about unified and explicitly designed unemployment
insurance systems. We calibrate our model using data for Spain due to the importance of
its informal sector and the availability of information. In particular, we use data for the
end of the 90’s, when unemployment and the size of the informal sector were relatively high.
We aware that in the last 25 years unemployment rate, informal sector participation, and
labor markets regulations have changed significantly in Spain. Therefore, the conclusions of
this exercise may not apply to the current Spanish economy where the labor market perfor-
mance has substantially improved. However, these results may still be valid for developing
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countries, whose current labor market structure is similar to that used in the calibration.
Most of the parameters are taken from previous literature. We interpret each period as a
month and set the discount factor β = 0.994 (annual interest rate of 7.5%). We normalized
workers’ productivity, ω, and effort in the formal labor market, a¯ to one. Data about average
tenure in Spain prescribes δ = 0.015.12. The relative risk aversion coefficient, σ, is set equal
to 2, which is a common value in the real business cycle literature.13
The calibration strategy uses the “actual” unemployment insurance scheme instead of the
optimal contract. That is, for plausible combinations of ρ and $, we compute the stationary
distribution of an economy in which agents take optimal decisions considering the “actual”
unemployment insurance scheme. From this distribution, we calculate unemployment and
informal sector participation. These outcomes are then compared with those in the data.
The calibration consists in finding values of ρ and $ compatible with our targets. This
strategy is natural since unemployment and informal sector participation are outcomes of
the optimal reaction of individuals to the actual system.
The calibration matches unemployment rate and informal sector size in Spain for 1997.
Unemployment rate, µ, was 18.5 percent while production in the informal sector as a pro-
portion of the GDP, ζ, was 23 percent—Schneider and Enste (2000).
In Spain, unemployed workers qualify for benefits if they have contributed to social
security over a minimum period in the previous years. Depending on their employment
duration, unemployed workers receive payments from 4 months to a maximum of 2 years.
After that period, they qualify for unemployment subsidy. A typical worker receives 70
percent replacement ratio during the first 6 months, and 60 percent for the next 18 months.
12According to Arranz and Garca-Serrano (2004) the average tenure in the private sector is around 6 years.
13Here we depart from the traditional values in the literature of optimal unemployment insurance. Pavoni
(2003) works with log preferences (σ = 1) while Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) set σ = 0.5.
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Unemployment subsidy is 80 percent of the minimum wage. This implies a replacement ratio
of 30 percent after two years of unemployment.14 Taxes financing the system are set at 5
percent.
Workers decide effort and hidden labor market participation to maximize their life-time
utility, taking as given the ”actual” unemployment insurance scheme. This scheme is rep-
resented by (τ, {bn}∞n=1), where subindex n refers to unemployment duration. Since bn is
constant for n ≥ n∗, the agent’s problem has the following recursive representation
Vˆ un = max
a,s
u(bn + s$)− v(a+ s) + β[p(a)Vˆ e + (1− p(a))Vˆ un+1],∀n ∈ {0, 1, ..., n∗ − 1}
Vˆ un∗ = max
a,s
u(bn + s$)− v(a+ s) + β[p(a)Vˆ e + (1− p(a))Vˆ un∗ ],∀n ≥ n∗
Vˆ e = u(ω(1− τ))− v(a¯) + β[(1− δ)Vˆ e + δVˆ u0 ],
where Vˆ un is life-time utility of an unemployed agent with unemployment spell n and Vˆ
e
corresponds to life-time utility of an employed agent.
The backward solution to the previous problem provides policy functions an and sn that
can be used to compute the stationary distribution of agents over unemployment spell, Ω¯.
The stationary distribution is a fixed point of the transition law
Ω′0 =
(
1−
∑
n
Ωn
)
δ
Ω′n = (Ωn−1(1− p(an−1))∀n < n∗,
Ω′n∗ = [Ωn∗−1(1− p(an∗−1)) + Ωn∗(1− p(an∗))].
In the stationary distribution, we measure the unemployment rate and the informal sector
size by
µ =
∑
n
Ω¯n(1− sn),
14This number is obtained dividing 80 percent of the minimum wage by the income per capita.
29
ζ =
$χ
$χ+ (1−∑n Ω¯n)ω ,
where χ =
∑
n Ω¯nsn is the average participation in the hidden labor market. Table 2
summarizes our calibration. With these parameters the artificial economy reproduces µ =
0.1787 and ζ = 0.2326, very close to our targets, 0.185 and 0.23, respectively.
Table 2: Calibration strategy
Parameter Value Description Basis and Targets
β 0.994 Discount factor Interest rate
σ 2 Relative risk aversion coefficient Standard
γ 2 Search cost elasticity Standard
ω 1 Productivity in formal sector Normalization
a¯ 1 Effort when employed Normalization
δ 0.015 Separation rate Average tenure
ρ 0.045 Parameter in probability of finding a job Unemployment rate
$ 0.415 Wage in informal sector Informal sector size
4.2 Optimal policy
The dynamic of the hidden labor market participation is crucial in determining the dynamic
of optimal payments. Figure 1 shows the path for search effort and hidden labor market
participation while Figure 2 shows optimal unemployment payments and wages. In both
cases initial promised utility is set such that the planner breaks even.15
Figure 1 indicates that the optimal participation is initially zero and search effort in-
creases with unemployment spell, as it does in the economy without hidden labor market.
After approximately 3 years of unemployment, when effort peaks, participation jumps and
search effort drops. After that point, participation increases and search effort decreases
15Planner’s surplus in our contract does not consider any administrative cost. According to data from
the “Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales”, available at www.mtas.es, slightly above 10 percent of the
expenditures on social assistance went to administrative costs during 1999. To account for these costs, we
subtract 0.07 for each period from the surplus functions before we set them equal to 0.
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Figure 1: Search effort and hid-
den labor market participation.
Figure 2: Unemployment pay-
ments and net wages dynamics.
gradually toward fairly steady levels. Similarly, Figure 2 shows that unemployment pay-
ments and wages decrease smoothly while the agent is not participating in the hidden labor
market. When participation jumps, payments drop to zero but the dynamic of wages is not
significantly affected.
Some aspects are remarkable from this behavior. First, required effort is not mono-
tonically increasing in the unemployment spell. The reason is that in order to induce an
increase in participation, it is optimal to reduce the search effort such that the marginal
cost of inducing participation falls. Second, in the early phase of unemployment, workers
are fundamentally searchers with no participation in the hidden labor market. It is worth
noting that our contract does not imply hidden labor market participation during the first
3 years of unemployment. Thus, it is very likely that unemployed agents find a job before
they start to participate in the hidden labor market. Finally, hidden labor market partici-
pation increases. This is because at this point consumption has decreased implying a higher
marginal benefit of participation. It is also remarkable that once participation is induced,
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unemployment payments drop sharply down to zero. That is, with a hidden labor market,
it is optimal to give no payment for workers with a sufficiently large unemployment spell.
The reason is simple, if workers obtain payments and participate in the hidden labor market,
large unemployment spells are not strong enough threats to encourage search effort.
Finally, notice the qualitative similarities with the linear cost of effort case. For instance,
participation is initially zero and then increases sharply up to a fairly constant level. Like-
wise, unemployment payments reduce gradually during the initial phase, but then, when
workers participate in the hidden labor market, they drop fast to zero.16
4.3 Budget Savings
In this section we quantify the budget savings of switching from the stylized Spanish scheme
presented in the previous section to the optimal program considering participation in the
hidden labor market.
As described above, during the calibration we calculate the stationary distribution over
unemployment spell, Ω¯. With this distribution at hand, we can compute the present value
of providing unemployment insurance forever using the Spanish system (CS),
CS =
1
r
[∑
n
Ω¯nbn −
(
1−
∑
n
Ω¯n
)
ω(1− τ)
]
.
Similarly, using the solution to the recursive problem of an unemployed agent in Spain,
(Vˆ un , Vˆ
e), we transform the distribution over n to a distribution over U . Then, we calculate
the cost of providing the same distribution of life-time utility with the optimal contract (CN),
CN = −
[∑
n
Ω¯nV
u(Vˆ un ) +
(
1−
∑
n
Ω¯n
)
V e(Vˆ e)]
]
.
16A similar reasoning to the one used in the linear case can be adopted here. First, participation also
increases consumption linearly in this framework. Second, even though v′() is no longer constant, it is
different from zero for any positive effort a. These aspects explain why no participation in the initial phase
of unemployment is possible. In addition, consumption may be smooth even with drops in the payments as
long as there exist a corresponding drop in search intensity that stimulate higher participation.
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Important inter-temporal budget savings are associated with the implementation of the
optimal contract. Given the stationary distribution of life-time utility, the cost under Span-
ish scheme is 42.18. On the other hand, providing the same life-time utility distribution with
the optimal contract costs 21.65. These savings come from two sources. First, the standard
savings arising from the Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) type of contract; that is, from a con-
tract considering deviation form search effort toward leisure. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1996)
calibrate this optimal contract for the Spanish economy and find savings ranging between
20%-37%. We believe the additional savings are strictly related with the implementation of a
contract considering deviation form search effort toward hidden labor market participation.
5 A type-dependent unemployment insurance?
Separation rates may differ across workers. Therefore, it may be important to design a δ-
dependent unemployment insurance. Wang and Williamson (2002) perform an exercise in
these lines. In the case of fully experience rating, in the sense that taxes in each “industry”
fully fund unemployment benefits for workers in that industry, they find that the replace-
ment ratio is lower for agents in industries where the nature of production implies frequent
transitions between employment and unemployment. However, they find it is optimal to
extend benefits indefinitely for each type.
In this section we answer a quantitative question: Do hidden labor markets reinforce
the importance of a δ-dependent unemployment insurance? To that end, we compute the
optimal contract for three values of δ (0.01, 0.015 and 0.02) for an economy with an important
hidden labor market ($ = 0.415)—as calibrated for Spain—and for an economy with a very
small one ($ = 0.05). For the remaining parameters we use the values in the benchmark
calibration in both economies.
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This experiment fits in the environment of Wang and Williamson (2002) in which there
are workers employed in different industries, with different separation rates, and a worker
who is re-employed after an unemployment spell always returns to employment in the same
industry. Following the case of fully experience rating in Wang and Williamson (2002), we
start the experiment at the level of payments for which promised utility results in a balanced
budget for each δ considered.
Figure 3 shows that without an important informal sector the optimal payments’ dynam-
ics is not significatively affected by the separation rate. In fact, as in Wang and Williamson
(2002), it just changes the level at which the payments start without affecting payments du-
rations. In contrast, when we consider an economy with an important hidden labor market—
see Figure 4, the dynamics of payments varies with the separation rate. In particular, the
duration of payments increases from 29 to 55 months when the separation rate increases from
0.01 to 0.02. This result clearly prescribes an easy-to-implement contract for the optimal
δ-dependent unemployment insurance in an economy with a hidden labor market. That is,
the duration of payments should be shorter for workers with higher separation rates. Thus,
considering the existence of a hidden labor market is also relevant because it reinforces the
importance of an δ-dependent unemployment insurance system.
The intuition behind this result goes as follow. The planner considers employment of
workers with lower separation rates more “valuable”. Therefore, it is willing to delay partic-
ipation in the hidden labor marketextending the initial phase of unemployment promoting
high search intensity for longer periods.
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mal payments, $ = 0.415.
6 Conclusions
The problem of the optimal unemployment insurance has been addressed from the perspec-
tive of a principal-agent framework since the pioneering work of Shavell and Weiss (1979).
Early literature mainly focuses on the moral hazard problem arising under non-observability
of search effort. More recent works emphasize also the non-observability of assets. How-
ever, the implications of the existence of a hidden labor market were unknown. This was
an important omission in the unemployment insurance literature because the incorporation
of a hidden labor market has non-trivial consequences in the treatment of the problem.
Moreover, understanding the role of a hidden labor market is highly relevant given that the
informal labor market, a hidden market by nature, represents a sizeable segment of the labor
market in many countries. This paper fills this gap by providing an environment in which
unemployed workers can simultaneously search for a job and participate in a hidden labor
market.
The main conclusions are
35
1. The presence of a hidden labor market imposes an endogenous lower bound for promised
utilities and, unless the cost of effort is linear, an extra incentive compatible constraint
must be added.
2. With linear cost of effort, when the optimal unemployment insurance can be char-
acterized, there are two important phases. First, consumption decreases during un-
employment and workers do not participate in the hidden labor market. Second, for
sufficiently large unemployment spells, the lower bound for promised utilities is reached.
After that period, promised utility if unemployed remains constant at the lower bound.
Moreover, during this phase consumption remains constant, payments become zero and
participation jumps to a positive constant.
3. In an economy calibrated to Spain, the initial phase of unemployment spell has workers
searching for a job with no participation in the hidden labor market and unemploy-
ment payments gradually decreasing. Around the third year of unemployment, the
participation jumps away from zero and payments drop to zero.
4. Also in the numerical exercise, fairly large budget savings—compared with the Spanish
system—are obtained when the unemployment insurance system takes into account the
existence of a hidden labor market.
This paper suggests two main policy lessons. The first one has to do with the inconve-
nience of providing unemployment payments indefinitely. This is a very important difference
with the previous literature, where efficiency requires that unemployment payments last
indefinitely. The existence of a hidden labor market together with payments forever, guar-
antee sufficiently high consumption even after a very long period of unemployment. As a
consequence, long unemployment spells are not serious threats to encourage search effort.
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The second lesson is associated with the provision of an type-dependent unemployment sys-
tem. When the hidden labor market is not important, the optimal payments’ dynamic does
not change significatively with the separation rate. However, the profile of unemployment
payments—in particular payments duration—dramatically changes with the separation rate
when the hidden labor market is important. Since the separation rates are usually different
among worker groups, this result suggests that an type-dependent contract may be optimal.
Specifically, the numerical exercise indicates that the duration of payments should be shorter
for the high-separation-rate group.
The current work induces interesting directions for future research. A natural extension
is to incorporate different sources of heterogeneity among workers. For instance, we could
consider an environment with human capital depreciation and two type of workers, namely,
skilled and unskilled. The worker’s type and human capital are both observable. It is
plausible that the depreciation rate while not employed in the formal sector differs across
workers’ type. This introduces interesting consequences in the design of the optimal contract.
For instance, it is possible that the contract prescribes a higher search effort and a lower
hidden labor market participation for workers whose human capital depreciates faster—
presumably more skilled workers. Alternatively, we could consider an environment with
non-observable types. Types can play a role either in the productivity in the hidden labor
market or in the cost of effort. In any case, it could be interesting to analyze incentive
provision under such frameworks.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that at any arbitrary period of time T, the constrained
efficient contract W∗ = (P∗, I∗) delivers a promised utility UT (W∗;hT ) < U . We prove this
violates incentive compatibility by constructing a feasible deviation for any possible labor
status mT providing a utility higher than U .
• If mT = u, consider the following feasible deviation P˜ , with (a˜t(ht), s˜t(ht)) = (0, s∗) if
mt = u, and (a˜t(h
t), s˜t(h
t)) = (0, 0) if mt = e. Clearly, P˜ ∈ A and UT ((P˜ , I);hT ) =
U > UT ((P , I);hT ). Hence, the contractW∗ is not incentive compatible and therefore,
cannot be the constrained efficient contract.
• If mT = e, define T̂ as the first period of that employment spell. By property (8),
UbT (W∗;h bT ) = UT (W∗;hT ). Now consider the situation in T̂−1. By definition, mbT−1 =
u. Moreover, since mbT = e, it has to be the case that the contract prescribes abT−1(·) >
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0. However, if UT (W∗;hT ) < U , it is the case that abT−1(·) > 0 is not compatible
incentive because a deviation with a˜bT−1(·) = 0 implies higher utility than U . To see
this notice that since v is strictly increasing,
UbT−1(W∗;hbT−1) = u(cbT−1)− v(sbT−1 + abT−1)+
β[p(abT−1)UbT (W∗;hbT |mbT = e) + (1− p(abT−1))U bT (W∗;hbT |mbT = u)]
< u(cbT−1)− v(sbT−1)+
β[p(abT−1)UbT (W∗;hbT |mbT = e) + (1− p(abT−1))U bT (W∗;hbT |mbT = u).]
We showed in the first part of this proof that during unemployment, promised utility
must be at least U ; i.e.,
U ≤ U bT−1(W∗;hbT |m bT = u).
Then if U bT−1(W∗;hbT |m bT = e) < U , it is the case that
UbT−1(W∗;hbT−1) < u(cbT−1)− v(sbT−1) + βU bT (W∗;hbT |mbT = u). (34)
The last expression indicates that W∗, which prescribes abT−1 > 0, is not incentive
compatible because a deviation with a˜bT−1 = 0 provides higher utility to the worker.
Hence, W∗ cannot be the constrained efficient contract.
Proof of lemma 1
Proof: Take U ≥ U and consider the contract W˜ . For each t and ht it assigns bt(ht) = b˜,
st(h
t) = s˜, at(h
t) = 0, and wt(h
t) = w˜. Define (b˜, w˜, s˜) by
u′(b˜+ s˜$)$ = v′(s˜), (35)
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U =
u(b˜+ s˜$)− v(s˜)
1− β , (36)
u(b˜+ s˜$)− v(s˜) = u(w˜)− v(a¯). (37)
By construction u(ct(h
t))−v(xt(ht)) is constant across time and histories and Ut(W˜ ;ht) = U .
It remains to prove that W˜ ∈ C. Since deviations are only possible during unemployment
and a contract is incentive compatible against any possible deviation if and only if it is
incentive compatible against one period deviation, incentive compatibility implies that for
each t and each ht
U ≥ max
(s,a)
u(b˜+ s$)− v(s+ a) + βU.
s.t a ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, and s+ a ≤ ϑ.
(38)
In (38) we impose the fact that for each history and period, Ut(W˜ ;ht) = U . Clearly, (38) is
satisfied because the solution of the maximization problem implies a = 0 and s = s˜. Hence,
W˜ ∈ C(U ;h0).
Proof of lemma 2
Proof: The proof is straight forward. The first best contract is characterized by equations
(19)-(23). Under observability of effort, (ICC1) is not relevant while (ICC2) is satisfied by
(19).
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Proof of lemma 3
Proof: Consider the following Relaxed Problem:
V uR (U) = max
b,e,s,Ue,Uu
−b+ β[p(a)V e(U e) + (1− p(a))V uR (Uu)] (RP)
s.t.
u(b+ s$)− v(s+ a) + β[p(a)U e + (1− p(a))Uu]− U = 0 (PKC)
βp′(a)[U e − Uu]− v′(s+ a) = 0 (ICC1)
(U e, Uu) ∈ Φ2 (FPUC)
s ≥ 0.
We need to prove that if v is linear, the solution for (RP) also solves (PP). To that end,
denoteD(U) the set of all (b, a, s, Uu, U e) satisfying (ICC1),(ICC2),(PKC), (FPUC), and non
negativity for s. Likewise, denote DR(U) the set of all (b, a, s, U
u, U e) satisfying previous
restriction but (ICC2). Clearly D(U) ⊆ DR(U). Hence, V uR (U) ≥ V u(U). Notice however
that
(e˜, s˜, U˜ e, U˜u) ∈ argmaxDR(U)V uR (U)
satisfies (ICC2). To see this, take first order condition with respect to s and notice that
λ > 0 and φ ≥ 0. In consequence, (e˜, s˜, U˜ e, U˜u) ∈ D(U) and solves (PP); otherwise, it will
not be true that V uR (U) ≥ V u(U).
Algorithm
1. Define a grid for promised utilities: U = {U1, ..., UN}. The range of U is set such that
U1 = U and UN is big enough to guarantee that the value functions become negative.
2. Define search effort grids for effort and participation: Ef = {a1, ..., aM} and S =
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{s1, ..., sM}, where a1 = s1 = 0, and aM and sM are big enough to avoid grid-dependent
corner solutions.
3. Make initial guess V u,0(U) = V u,FB(U) for each U ∈ U, where V u,FB(U) is the first
best planner’s surplus. For values out of the grid, use piece-wise linear interpolation.
4. Iteration i starts. Get V u,i+1 = TV u,i as follow:
(a) Suppose s = 0. Use equation (27) to obtain b. Given b, for each a ∈ Ef use
(ICC1) and (PKC) to solve for the values of U e and Uu. Choose the combination
{a, b, U e, Uu} maximizing (PP). Check if (ICC2) is satisfied for s = 0. If it is
satisfied, the maximization ends. If not, go to the next step.
(b) Look for the best solution {a, s} ∈ Ef × S, using (ICC1), (ICC2) and (PKC) to
solve for the corresponding b, U e and Uu.
5. Check convergency. That is, given a metric d, evaluate d(V u,i, V u,i+1) > ²? If so, let
V u,i = V u,i+1 and go to (4), otherwise END.
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